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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE· STATE O·F UTAH 
BURTON 0. COMPTON, BURTON 
STANLEY COMPTON, and LES-
TER 0. 001\tiPTON, 
App·ellamts, 
-vs.-
OGDEN UNION RAILWAY AND 
DEPOT COMPANY, a corporation, 
Respondent. 
Case No. 
7541 
Appellants' Brief 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellants, surviving husband, sons and heirs at 
law of Emma Compton, deceased, commenced this action 
on October 12, 1949, for general and special damages 
alleged to have- been suffered by them following the 
wrongful death of Emma Compton by reason of the 
negligence of the defendant. The gravamen of the com-
plaint was that while the deceased, with the permission 
and license of the defendant, was crossing the railroad 
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yards operated by the defendant, and at a place where 
the public was licensed and permitted to be, was care-
lessly and negligently killed by the defendant in its 
operation of a diesel locomotive. 
Respondent, by its answer, admitted all of the fore-
going except that it denied the permission and license 
by the deceased and public, and further denied each and 
all of the alleged acts of negligence by the defendant. 
Respondent further alleged that any injury suffered by 
the plaintiffs as a result of the death of Emma Compton 
was contributed to by the careless and negligent conduct 
of Emma Compton herself. -· 
The cause came on for trial before the court sitting 
with a jury on the 18th day of April, 1950, and upon con-
clusion of plaintiffs' case the respondent moved for a 
judgment of non-suit against the plaintiffs, based upon 
the contributory negligence as a matter of law of Emma 
Compton, and the court orally granted defendant's mo-
tion for dismissal of the action upon the ground of 
contributory negligence. 
On April 29, 1950, findings of fa.ct, conclusions of 
law and judgment were filed. 
From the judgment by the court appellants appeal. 
In our statement of facts of the case we shall ab-
stract as briefly as possible the testimony of the wit-
nesses and evidence called and produced by the appel-
lants. 
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Wallace F. Feller, a police officer of the Ogden City 
Police Department, testified that early on the morning 
of September 8, 1949, he received a call to investigate 
an accident on West 24th Street, Ogden, Utah, and 
I 
accompanied by one officer, Butcher, another police offi-
cer of Ogden, they responded to said call and drove west 
on 24th Street to the place where a viaduct crosses the 
railroad yards and down underneath the viaduct of the 
railroad to the scene of an accident that had occurred. 
Upon arriving the officers found that a person, later 
identified as Emma Compton, had been killed. The body 
was located about "75 feet south on the railroad track 
under the viaduct" (R. 7) and about 50 feet further 
southeast the diesel locomotive was standing on the 
track. This officer then set the point of impact ap--
proximately 25. feet south from the westernmost stair-
, 
way by reason of gouge marks along the outside of 
the north rail (R. 8). These marks continued parallel 
with the railroad for about 50 feet. The witness further 
testified to these distances in reference to Exhibit A (R. 
15, 16). 
In a conversation with the train crew the officer 
stated, ''All three of them admitted that they never saw 
the body or the person until they had passed over her, 
and that they were all three riding at the back of the 
engine in the· cab". Also, that the locomotive was 
coasting down a slight grade and no warning was 
sounded (R. 10). The witness testified that he has had 
substantial experience in J:>Olice work in Ogden and was 
well acquainted with the area where the accident occur-
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red. He testified that he has seen many persons using 
the stairway and walking below the stairway, and fur-
ther that there is a beaten path running along the north 
side of the track ''right at the edge of the ties for about 
three feet wide" (R. 11, 12). 
Plaintiffs introduced as Exhibit A a photograph of 
the scene taken the morning of the accident wherein the 
well-trodden path is clearly visible (R. 13). 
Witness testified that there are various business 
activities other than the railroad south of the viaduct 
within the yards, such as a creamery and ice plant, and 
that to his own knowledge employees of these businesses 
use this stairway and path in going to and returning 
from their employment (R. 17, 18). 
Witness further stated th~t a person walking from 
the base of the stairway toward the track along the 
path would reach the point of impact before he could 
see down the track (R. 25). 
Vernon R. Butcher, a member of the police depart-
ment of Ogden, testified that he was present at the scene 
of the accident on the morning of September 8, 1949, 
and was present during the conversations with the three 
members of the crew of the locomotive involved. Wit-
ness testified that all three of the crew members at that 
time stated that the engine had passed over deceased's 
body before any of them had seen her (R. 28). The 
engineer stated that due to a curve in the track he can-
not see anything from his side of the cab and that the 
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other t"\YO rre"\Y members "\Yho "'"ere both in the cab stated 
that they were not looking out of the cab windew on 
the other side ( R. 29). 
Witness further testified that there is a. ''well 
beaten" path along the track (R. 29) and to his own 
knowledge many employees of various business activities 
in the vicinity use the stairway and path in going to and 
from their employment (R. 29, 30). 
Witness finally testified that the engmeer stated 
that the locomotive was coasting down a grade at the 
time of the accident (R. 30). 
William Klinke, a former employee of the defendant 
who had worked in the vicinity of the accident for six 
years, testified that it is his own knowledge a great many 
people habitually use the stairway in question and in 
fact "that it is practically the only way they have to get 
down there unless they come down around the road and 
that is the way of heavy traffic" (R. 32). 
Witness testified that the hazard on all other s~de;; 
, 
of the industries located in this area are so great that 
the stairway and path in question are the ''only way 
that is half way safe'' for these people to go to work (R. 
33). 
Witness then stated that during the years when he 
was employed by the defendant and was riding locomo-
tives in the area in question he saw people travelling 
along the side of the track and ''always had to be on 
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the lookout for them - you never knew when they were 
going to get in front" (R. 34). 
This witness further testified that "if anyone comes 
down this stairway where a locomotive comes down this 
hill, it is hard for the engine crew to see anybody step-
ping out· here, and it is hard for this person to see the 
engine coming, so it is a hazard there" (R. 35). 
Witness finally stated that people, as an established 
custom, come down the stairway and follow along the 
edge of the track (R. 35). 
Emily Christensen, a yard clerk employed by the 
defendant, testified that she has worked in a building in 
the immediate vicinity of the accident for seven years 
and has seen people regularly use the stairway in ques-
tion and walk along the edge of the track at all times 
and all seasons. 
Mirtle Brady, an employee of the Armour Creamery 
and a co-worker and friend of the deceased, testified that 
she and the deceased had been employed seasonally by 
Armour Company for three years. She had observed 
many people using the stairway and path in question in 
going to and from work, and used that route herself (R. 
41). 
Mrs. Earl E. Laws, an employee of Brown Poultry 
Company, one of the businesses located in the area in 
question, testified that on the morning of the accident 
on her way to work she met the deceased at the top of 
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the stair,Yay, 'valked down the stairs with her and over 
to the path. Witness clearly s~ated that as she reached 
the lower part of the stairs she looked to see whether 
there '"'as any movement on the track and saw nothing. 
She later repeated that she saw no train (R. 46). 
Witness then stated and later repeated that they 
had in fact ,,~alked ~4 FEW STEPS when the accident 
occurred (R. 46 and 50), contrary to the third finding of 
fact, that she and deceased had walked two or three 
steps along the track. She had not heard any sound of 
the approaching train, nor had she seen the train whic]l 
came from behind them (R. 46 and 50) .. Witness stated 
that she had previously used the same route to go to 
work and had seen many others doing so (R. 47). 
Both this witness and witness Christensen stated 
that the morning of the accident was clear (R. 38, 40). 
Throughout the transcript of testimony the fact 
repeatedly appears that the locomotive approached from 
behind deceased and witness Laws (R. 7, 9). It further 
appears that anyone proceeding from the bottom of the 
stairway along the well defined and heavily traveled path 
traversed by the deceased in the direction taken by the 
deceased, would have his back toward a train coming 
along the track, as did the locomotive in the instance in 
question. This is true from the moment he left the stair-
way, due to the fact that the path runs at an angle from 
the base of the stairway to a point where it parallels 
the track (R. 9, 11, 12, 15, 21). 
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Witness Laws emphatically and repeatedly stated 
that the train came from behind deceased and herself 
and that the :first time she saw the train was when it 
struck Mrs. Compton (R. 46, 49). 
Mr. Earl Compton testified that he had taken photo-
graphs comprising plaintiffs' Exhibits E through N, 
showing various views of the area involved herein as it 
appeared only six days after the accident (R. 56, 61). 
From an examination of these photographs it clearly 
appears that a large concrete abutment near the bottom 
of the stairway interferes with the view of the track by 
anyone standing on the stairs or at the bottom thereof. 
The rest ·of the material evidence concerned the 
subject of damages. 
STATElVIENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON 
BY APPEI_JLANTS 
Appellants rely upon the following points: 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING 
RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR A DISMISSAL OF 
THE ACTION AND RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR 
DIRECTED VERDICT AND FILING ITS WRITTEN 
JUDGMENT PURSUANT THERETO ON THE 
GROUND OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF 
THE DECEASED, EMMA COMPTON, AS A 
MATTER OF LAW. 
POINT II. 
THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND THE EVI-
DENCE DO NOT SUPPORT THE CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW NUMBERS I AND II THAT THE DE-
8 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CEASED EMl\iA COMPTON WAS GUILTY OF CON-
TRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE, AND THAT SAID 
CONTRIBUTOR1T NEGLIGENCE WAS A COM-
P:CETE BAR TO THE ACTION AS A MATTER OF 
LAW. 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING 
RESPONDENT'S l\10TION FOR DISMISSAL OF 
THE ... ~CTION AND A DIRECTED VERDICT AND 
IN REFUSING TO SUBMIT THE APPELLANTS' 
CASE TO THE JURY ON THE 'THEORY OF LAST 
CLEAR CH ... L\_NCE. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING 
RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR A DISMISSAL OF 
THE ACTION AND RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR 
DIRECTED VERDICT AND FILING ITS WRITTEN 
JUDGI\IENT PURSUANT THERETO ON THE 
GROUND OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGEN.CE OF 
THE DECEASED, EMMA COMPTON, AS A 
MATTER OF LAW. 
POINT II. 
THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND THE EVI-
DENCE DO NOT SUPPORT THE CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW NUMBERS I . ..L\ND II THAT THE DE-
CEASED EMMA COMPTON WAS GUILTY OF CON-
TRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE, AND THAT SAID 
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE WAS A COM-
PLETE BAR TO THE ACTION AS A MATTER OF 
LAW. 
These points are directed to the trial court's ruling 
granting respondent's motion for a dismissal of the 
action and directed verdict, and will be argued together. 
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In considering the action of the trial court in its 
determinatjon of contributory negligence of the deceased 
as a matter of law, appellants are entitled, at the outset, 
to the presumption that the deceased was in the exercise 
of due care. Lewis v. Rio Grande Western Ry. Co., 40 
Utah 483, 123 Pac. 97 ; Tremelling v. Southern Pacific 
Co., 51 Utah 189, 170 Pac. 80; Barker v. Savas, et al, 
52 Utah 262, 172 Pac. 672; Perrin v. Union Pac. R. Co., 
59 Utah 1, 201 Pac. 405. Even though a lady companion, 
Mrs. Laws, was walking along with the deceased on her 
right, there is no direct evidence as to just how the 
accident happened. 
Unless this case IS one of those exceptional cases 
mentioned in Lewis v. Rio Grande Western Ry. Co., 
supra, where but one conclusion can be drawn from the 
undisputed evidence, this presumption alone would en-
title appellants to have the issue of contributory negli-
gence submitted to the jury and in that same case, this 
court, speaking through Justice McCarty, stated: 
'' * * * Moreover, in cases of this kind, where 
the accident results in instant death, the rule 
seems to be that 'the law, out of regard to the 
instinct of self-preservation, presumes that the 
deceased at the time was in the exercise of due 
care, ''and this presumption is not ove-rthrown 
by the mere fact of injury.'' The burden rests 
upon the defendant to rebut this presumption.' 
(Flynn v. K. C., ·St. J. & C. B. R. Co., 78 Mo. 212, 
47 Am. Rep. 99.) 
''The Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Cir-
cuit, in the case of Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. Spike, 
121 Fed. 44, 57 C.C.A. 384, which involved this 
10 
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same prinri ple, after referring to the language of 
the :Nfissouri court ""hirh w·e have quoted, said: 
'' 'The presumption arising from this natural 
instinct of self-preservation stands in the place 
of positive evidence, and is sufficient to warrant 
a recovery, in the absence of countervailing testi-
mony.' 
''Citing with approval the following cases: 
Johnson v. Railroad Co., 20 N. Y. 65, 69, 75 Am. 
Dec. 375-; Oldfield v. N. Y. & Harland R. Co., 14 
N. Y. 310; Adams v. Iron Cliffs Co., 78 Mich. 271, 
44 N. W. 270, 18 Am. St. Rep. 441; Railway Co. 
v. State, 29 Md. 420, 438, 96 Am. Dec. 545; Rail-
road Co. v. Nowicki, 46 Ill. App. 566; City of 
Naples, 32 U. S. App. 613, 16 C.C.A. 421, 69 Fed. 
794; Allen v. Willard, 57 Pa. 374; Schum v. Rail-
road Co., 107 Pa. 8, 52 Am. Rep. 468; Cox v. Rail-
road Co., 123 N. C. 604, 31 S.E. 848; Cameron v. 
Railway Co., 8 N. D. 124, 77 N. W. 1016. 
"In the case of Ready v. Peavey Elevator Co., 
89 Minn. 154, 94 N. W. 442, the court said : 
" 'It is well to note that negligence is usually 
a question of fact, and that it is only in excep-
tional cases, where but one conclusion can be 
drawn from the undisputed evidence, that it is 
one of law; that, where a charge is made against 
a dead man that he was guilty of negligence caus-
ing his death, the presumption is very strong that, 
prompted by the instinct of self-preservation, he 
exercised due care, and that the presumption con-
tinues until the contrary is clearly made to 
appear.' 
''Ap-plying the well-settled principles of law 
to the facts in this case, we are not warranted in 
holding that Lewis was, as a matter of law, guilty 
of contributory negligence. Evans v. 0. S. L. R. 
11 
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Co., 37 Utah 431, 108 Pac. 638; 2 Thomp. on Neg., 
section 1699. '' 
Also, in Perrin v. Union Pac. R. Co., supra, this 
court reaffirmed its position as follows: 
''There was no direct evidence as to just how 
the accident happened. It was the duty of the 
deceased to go between the cars, after coupling 
was made and the train became stationary, to 
connect the air hose and open the angle cock 
between the train and the caboose. Under the 
facts disclosed by this record, the respondent was 
entitled to the presumption that the deceased 
was, at the time of the accident, in the exercise 
of ordinary care. Lewis v. Rio Grande Western 
Ry. Co., 40 Utah 483, 123 Pac. 97. That presump-
tion alone would entitle the respondent to have 
the question of contributory negligence submitted 
to the jury if there is evidence in the record tend-
ing to prove negligence on the part of the appel-
lant." 
Upon an examination of the case under considera-
tion in the light of the presumption of due care, the 
foregoing cases, and the facts, it is found: 
(a) There is no direct evidence as to just how the 
accident happened as concerns the- deceased, Emma 
Compton, and particularly the absence of any evidence 
as to what precautions were taken by the deceased for 
her own safety or protection. 
(b) There is evidence in the record proving the 
negligence of the defendant, and in this respect the atten-
12 
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tion of the court is inYited to Finding of Fact No. II of 
the :finding·s of fact in the transcript on appeal herein. 
(c) There is no countervailing testimony on behalf 
of defendant. 
There can be no serious disput~ as to the statements 
made in a, b, and c, and the trial court's ruling was based 
entirely upon the idea that the conclusion of contributory 
negligence on the part of the deceased was the only one 
that could be drawn. This the appellants deny. 
The evidence showed that a person approaching the 
lower part of the stairway upon which deceased was 
descending could not, because of the concrete abutment 
immediately to the west, see the entire track to the north-
west, as a considerable portion of the track was blocked 
out by this abutment, and this situation is clearly shown 
by defendant's Exhibit No. 1. As a matter of fact, the 
witness Mrs. Laws looked to the westward while at that 
place and failed to see any movement or traffic upon 
the track to the westward (R. 45, 46). The only reason-
able inferences applicable at that time and place were 
that the engine had not yet put in an appearance coming 
from that direction, or that the engine, standing or mov-
ing, was blocked out by the concrete abutment. This abut-
ment was only five feet north of the track (R. 19). When 
the deceased and Mrs. Laws left the bottom of the stair-
way the well-trodden and rough dirt pathway took a 
direction to the southeast, so that when the deceased and 
her companion came into a position where a full view 
13 
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of the tracks could be had they were walking with their 
backs to the direction from which the engine approached. 
The court will notice from plaintiffs' Exhibit C that this 
pathway, upon immediately leaving the bottom of the 
stairway, approaches the track upon an acute angle to 
the southeast, and the court will further notice that upon 
passing the two posts shown in that exhibit that the 
pathway then takes a direction which almost immediately 
parallels the tracks. If the deceased, up to the point of 
reaching those posts, had carefully looked for any train 
or cars approaching from the westward, and having seen 
nothing, as did the witness Mrs. Laws, she was not then 
required to maintain a constant lookout to the north-
west while she was walking southeast. The court knows 
that reasonable persons, exercising due caution for their 
own safety, and especially while going along a rough 
pathway in railroad yards, look where they are going-
not where they ha.ve been-and the deceased had every 
right, in the exercise of due care for her own safty, to 
rely upon her other senses, and particularly in this case, 
her sense of hearing. Noises and loud sounds are ex-
pected by people of normal experience from locomotive 
engines, and the important fact that cannot be over-
loooked in this case was that this diesel engine was 
QUIETLY coasting down grade, not under power, and 
gave no warning of any kind of its approach. It literally 
''sneaked'' up behind the two women who were walking 
upon the pathway paralleling the track and this fact, 
if nothing else, had a tendency to mislead the two pedes-
trians than would have been the case if the diesel engine 
had been run in a natural way. 
14 
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In the case of Newton v. Oregon Short Line R. R. 
Co., 43 Utah 219, 134 Par. 567, this court reversed a 
judgment for the defendant, and, in doing so, on page 
571 of that decision stated: 
"The fact that in this case the engine and 
tender were running backwards might have had 
a tendency to confuse, if not mislead, the deceased 
much more than might have been the case if the 
engine had been run in a natural way. * * * In 
view of all the circumstances, the question with 
regard to whether or not the deceased exercised 
ordinary care is, to say the least, one of uncer-
tainty and doubt, and hence must be submitted to 
the triers of the fact for their determination.'' 
The misleading and confusing effect that the opera-
tion of an engine in this manner can have upon people 
is demonstrated by the testimony of Mrs. ·Laws. 
'' Q. Now as you reached the lower part of 
these stairs, did you look to the westward to see 
whether or not there was any movement upon the 
track that comes through the viaduct there~-
"A. Yes I did, but I didn't see nothing. 
''Q. You didn't see any train~ 
''A. I didn't see a train.'' (R. 45, 46) 
'' Q. Now did you ever hear any sound of a 
train prior to that time, Mrs. Laws~ 
"A. No. 
'"'Q. To this occurrence~ 
"A. No. 
'' Q. And from which direction had that train 
come~ Was it from your back to your front~ 
15 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
''A. From the back. ' ' ( R. 46) 
Again upon cross-examination this same witness said: 
'' Q. Did you say anything at all to Mrs. 
Compton, here comes the Bamberger.~ 
''A. As Mrs. Compton fell I said, 'Here comes 
·the train', but I didn't see the train until I looked 
up and seen the wheels go over her, but I just 
thought that is what happ~ned, that it had hit 
her." 
All of the foregoing facts, assumptions, and reason-
able inferences were ignored by the trial court. 
Further, there is no positive evidence in the record 
that,. had the deceased looked to the westward at the 
time she was closely approaching the track and at a 
time when her back was turned, and at a time when her 
view was not obscured by the abutment or otherwise, 
that the engine would have been seen. It lies only within 
the knowledge of the train crew ho'v fast this equipment 
rounded the eurve and came into view, and then down 
the grade, and it is perfectly possible that the engine had 
been coming at quite a speed and then braked down 
shortly before running over and killing Mrs. Compton. 
Thus, the evidence is not clear and free from doubt that, 
had the deceased looked, she would have seen its ap-
proach. The only possible evidence on this subject was 
the admission of the engineer, Mr. Smith, that he was 
"coasting about ten miles per hour" (R. 10). Viewing 
that stataeament in the light most favorable to appel-
lants is that the train was coasting at a speed of ten 
miles per hour at the place where Mrs. Compton was 
killed. 
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Again the trial court ignored the foregoing reason-
able inferences and substituted its own fact not in evi-
dence, and throughout the entire matter the court 
assumed that the deceased, regardless of the peculiar 
facts and circumstances surrounding this case, was re-
quired to maintain a constant watch to her rear, contrary 
to the right of the jury to make that d~termination, and 
as declared by this eourt in the case ·of Malizia v. Ore-
gon Short Line R. Co., 53 Utah 122, 178 Pac. 756: 
''Again, whether, under a particular state of 
facts and circumstances, a traveler may be ex-
cused from maintaining a constant lookout in a 
particular direction is also, except in clear cases, 
a question of fact.'' 
Appellants urge that the facts and circumstances 
surrounding the death of Emma Compton were squarely 
within the following language of the 1\Ializia case, supra : 
''Now, whether the deceased should have acted 
differently, in view of all the circumstances, and 
whether what occurred at the time was sufficient 
to. excuse his conduct in attempting to cross the 
tracks, were all questions for the jury to solve, 
and cannot be determined either for or against 
him as questions of law. To say that but one con-
clusion, namely, that the deceased was guilty of 
negligence barring a recovery, is permissible, is, 
to our minds, ignoring many things which may 
affect human conduct under particular circum-
stances. 
"While as triers of fact we might entertain 
doubts whether the conduct of the deceased in 
passing in front of the front engine under the cir-
cumstances disclosed by the evidence, was excus-
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able or not, yet it is that very doubt, as was said 
in Newton v. Railroad Co., 43 Utah 219, 134 Pac. 
567, which makes it a question for the jury, and 
which requires us to yield to their judgment. This 
case does not fall within the principle which con-
trolled the cases of Tremelling v. Southern Pac1 
R. Co., 170 Pac. 80; Teakle v. Railroad, 32 Utah, 
276, 90 Pac. 402, 10 L.R.A. (N.S.) 486; Wilkinson 
v. Railroad, 35 U tab 110, 99 Pac. 446; Bates v. 
Railroad, 38 Utah, 568, 114 Pac. 527; and Kent v. 
Railroad, 167 Pac. 666; but it falls within the 
doctrine laid down in Newton v. Railroad, supra, 
namely, that where the facts and circumstances 
are such as to justify fair-minded men to arrive 
at different conclusions 'vith respect to the ques-
tion of negligence on the part of the defendant, 
or with respect to contributory negligence on the 
part of the injured person, or with reference to 
whether the negligence of the one or the other 
was the proximate cause of the accident, the case 
is one for the jury and not for the court. We can 
see no escape from the conclusion in this case 
that, in view of the facts and circumstances, it 
was proper to submit it to the jury.'' 
Other case of interest decided by this court where 
the facts and circumstances involved create no greater 
doubt than the facts and circumstances in this case are: 
Clark v. Union Pac. R. Co., 70 Utah 29, 257 Pac. 
1050. 
Pippy v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 79 Utah 439, 
11 Pac. 2d 305. 
Lewis v. Rio Grande Western Ry. Co., supra. 
Newton v. Oregon Short LineR. Co., 43 Utah 219, 
134 Pac. 567. 
Perrin v. Union Pac. R. Co., 59 Utah 1, 201 Pac. 
405. 
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POINT III. 
THE TRI.A.L COURT ERRED IN GRANTING 
RESPONDENT'S l\IOTION FOR DISMISSAL OF 
THE .A.CTION AND A DIRECTED VERDICT AND 
IN REFUSING TO SUBl\IIT THE APPELLANTS' 
C.A .. SE TO THE JURY ON THE THEORY OF LAST 
CLEAR CHANCE. 
At the expense and danger of repeating ourselves, 
it is found necessary to again discuss certain material 
facts in discussing this point. From the moment the de-
ceased Emma Compton left the bottom of the stairway 
mentioned in this ease and started on the rough dirt 
pathway which approa.cheq the track on an acute angle 
to the southeast, she was in a position of peril. At 
least until she passed the wooden posts to the north 
of the bottom of the stairway her view of the track was 
obstructed by the concrete abutment. As she proceeded 
from the stairway along this well defined path, approach-
ing at the acute angle and then parallel to the track, she 
was at all times facing away from the direction from 
which the train came. Again it is necessary to remind 
tlie court that the witness Laws, who was walking to the 
left of the deeeased, stated that she, the wtiness Laws, 
neither saw nor heard any locomotive approach. In other 
words, Laws and the deceased, walking with their backs 
turned toward the direction from which the train came, 
were completely and entirely oblivious of its approach. 
The train was necessarily some distance behind these 
two women, and even a casual glance by any member of 
the crew would have made known to them the inattention 
of these two women. 
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Under such circumstances, in the case of State v. 
Shain, 349 Mo. 27, 159 S. E. 2d 586, the court said: 
"This fact of obliviousness in and of itself 
can place a plaintiff in a position of peril. In other 
words, under the cited decisions, if a plaintiff is 
approaching the pathway of the defendant on a 
course which, unless he stops, will produce a col-
lision and if he is at the time oblivious to the 
presence and approach of the defendant, this in 
itself will cause him to be in a position of peril 
and not merely approaching a position of peril." 
The Restatement of Torts, Section 480, comment b, 
states: 
' 'Even such a chance that the plain tiff will not 
discover his peril is enough to require the de-
fendant to make a reasonable effort to avoid in-
juring him. Therefore, if there is anything in the 
demeanor or conduct of the plaintiff which to a 
reasonable man in the defendant's position would 
indicate that the plaintiff is inattentive and, there-
fore, will or may not discover the approach of the 
train, the engineer must take such steps as a 
reasonable man would think necessary under the 
circumstances. If a train is at some little distance, 
the blowing of a whistle would ordinarily be 
enough, until it is apparent that the whistle is 
either unheard or disregarded. The situation in 
which the plaintiff is observed may clearly indi-
cate that his inattention is likely to persist and 
that the blowing of the whistle will not be effec-
tive. If so, the engineer is not entitled to act upon 
the assumption that the plaintiff will awaken to 
his danger but may be liable if he does not so 
reduce the speed of his train as to. enable him to 
stop if necessary. Thus, if the engineer sees a 
Yehicle with the side curtains so drawn a.s to 
20 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
obstruct the driYer's view approaching on a day 
so 'vindy as to make it doubtful 'vhether the 
" .. histle will be heard, he may not be entitled to 
assume that the driver 'viii discover the approach 
of the train and may be liable if he fails to exer-
cise reasonable care to bring his train under the 
necessary control.'' 
In this ease it affirmatively and conclusively ap-
pears that the deceased " .. as oblivious to her danger and, 
being una" .. are of it, obviously could not discover her 
peril in time to remove herself and avoid the injury. Her 
back being to,vard the train at all times she could not see 
its approach, and not being able to see the danger she 
"\Yould, as a reasonable and normal person, be expected 
to use her other senses, including her sense of hearing, 
to detect the danger. The train was quietly coasting 
down grade during its approach to the time of impact, 
eliminating the possibility of a warning from this source_. 
There '""as no sounding of a bell, horn, whistle or other 
warning device. 
In the case of Huggans v. Southern Pac. Co., -----· 
Calif. ______ , 207 Pac. 2d 864, it is unequivocally stated that 
the doctrine of last clear chance applies to a person a p-
proaching a -Place of peril unaware of his danger, in such 
a manner that, if he remains oblivious, he will put him-
self in a position in which an injury to himself will result. 
Following the rule laid down in the Huggins case, supra, 
the last clear chance doctrine applies here, since de-
ceased was approachng a position of peril from the mo-
ment she left the stairway, and she was completely un-
aware of the approaching danger, and such inattentive-
21 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ness and obliviousness was known or should have been 
known to the operators of the locomootive. Under these 
circumstances, and following the restatement rule, the 
defendant clearly had a duty to make a reasonable effort 
to avoid the injury. No effort whatsoever was made. 
The evidence clearly shows that it was a long estab-
lished and well known use and custom for many people 
to use the stairway and path here involved. The defend-
ant obviously knew of and acquiesced, if not invited, in 
this use and custom. In such a situation the defendant's 
train operators were bound and obligated to keep a 
reasonable lookout for and anticipate the presence of 
people in the position of the deceased in order to prevent 
injury to them. 
Teakle v. San Pedro, L. A. & S. L. R. Co., 32 Utah 
275, 90 Pac. 402. 
The fact that the train crew in this case were so 
grossly inattentive that no member of .the crew was 
keeping a. lookout and thus failed to see the deceased in 
a position of peril does not excuse the defendant nor 
deny the application of the doctrine. 
In the Teakle case, supra, the court stated: 
"The more frequent declaration that the de-
fendant is not liable, unless he actually sees or 
knows the plaintiff's peril, are, however, equally 
erroneous, as too broad statements of abstract 
law, however proper they may have been with 
reference to the particular case under considera-
tion. The rule that a plaintiff is as matter of law 
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negligent if he fails to see what he was bound to 
look for and ought to have seen is rigidly en-
forced ; and the same rule must, in common jus-
tice, be applied to the defendant." 
In discussing Point III appellants are not unmindful 
of the recent cases of Graham v. Johnson, 109 Utah 346, 
166 Pac. 2d 230; Van Wagoner v. Union Pac. R. Co., 112 
Utah 189, 186 Pa.c. 2d 293; and Holmgren v. Union Pa.c. 
R·. Co., ______ Utah ______ , 198 ?ac. 459, wherein this court 
has discussed the rule of last clear chance. 
In the Graham ease, supra, this court, in discussing 
the rule of last clear chance, recognized Section 480, Vol. 
2, of Restatement of Torts. In that case this court, 
speaking through Justice Wolfe, stated: 
"Sec. 480 deals with the situation where the 
plaintiff was inattentive but had the abiltiy, h~d 
he been alert, to avoid the oncoming danger to 
which the aefendant was subjecting him. But in 
both cases the liability of the defendant arose 
because he failed to take the opportunity which 
he alone had time to avoid doing . the plaintiff 
harm even though the plaintiff was negligent in 
getting himself in a position where he was help.;. 
less or because he was so inattentive that he was 
not alert to the approaching danger over which 
defendavnt had control. And in both cases to hold 
the defendant liable it must plainly appear to the 
jury that defendant knew or reasonably should 
have known of plaintiff's helpless pBril or of his 
inattention and alter such realization or after he 
reasonably, had he been conductiJn,g himself with 
the vigilwnce required of ~~im, should have known 
it, 'is negligent in failing to utilize with reasonable 
care and competence his then existing ability to 
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avoid harming the plaintiff.' In the clear chance 
doctrine the plaintiff's negligence has become in 
a sense :fixed and realizable and on to this state 
of things defendant approaches on to the negli-
gent plaintiff with and in control of the danger. 
* * * * * 
''The jury could find that Darlene, if she was 
approaching in line with the inattentive Gary or 
so approximately in line with him as to seemingly 
be an approaching danger to him, should have 
realized that he was unaware of her approach and 
timely warned him.'' 
The Van Wagoner case, supra, wherein this court 
denied the plaintiff the application of the rule, is dis-
tinguishable from the instant case. The court concluded 
that the train operatives were able to assume that the 
driver of the approaching vehicle would stop until he 
was so close to the railroad track that a reasonable per-
son would have known otherwise, but when that distance 
of knowing otherwise was made apparent there was ~o 
reasonable opportunity to stop the train in time to avoid 
the collision. In the instant case no one will seriously 
argue that it would have taken nothing more than the 
sounding of a horn or the ringing of a bell to have warned 
deceased and a voided this tragic death. Also, this loco-
motive had the ability to stop within approximately fifty 
feet of the body of the deceased when nothing of the 
accident was known to them until they had passed over 
the body before any member of the crew had seen her. 
This is shown clearly by plaintiffs' Exhibit A, and is 
shown in that exhibit at the place where Officer Feller 
found it and the body (R. 12). 
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In the Van-Wagoner case Justice Latimer recognized 
the theory under Section 480 of the Restatement of Torts 
as did Justice Wolfe in the Graham ease. 
The Holmgren case, supra, denied the plaintiff the 
right to apply the rule, but again in that case the court 
recogni_zed the situation of reasonable apparent inatten-
tion and obliviousness to approaching danger. The court 
stated that train operatives have a right to assume that 
the car would stop in a place of safety, ''provided there 
was no appearance in the acts of conduct of the driver 
or the movements of the car, or other circumstances, to 
indicate that the driver was oblivious and did not intend 
to stop.'' And in quoting Thomasson v. Henwood, 235 
Mo. App. 211, 146 S.W. 2d 88, 93, '' * * * and there is 
nothing in the conduct of the driver to indicate that he 
is unaware of the approaching train, no duty rests upon 
the engineer to act, either in the duty of reducing the 
speed of his train or sounding a warning' whistle.'' Im-
mediately following the quotation of the Thomasson case 
the court states : '' The rules stated in the a hove q noted 
authorities are followed in this jurisdiction.'' 
In conclusion it appears desirable to point out that 
the status of the deceased, while upon the respondent's 
yards as a business invitee and has a duty owing to her 
as such, is not directly presented or argued for the 
reason that the negligence of respondent was made a 
jury issue, and even though this same negligence bor-
dered upon a wanton, reckless and criminal act upon the 
part of the train crew and respondent when they deliber-
25 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ately shut their eyes to a dangerous use that had existed 
at that time and place for many years. The basic idea 
behind the presumption of due care and the rule of last 
clear chance, based, as they are, upon human experience 
and a humanitarian policy, are designed to protect 
against this very same set of circumstances and careless 
action, and to insure to the injured parties their funda-
mental right to a jury determination of the rights and 
duties involved. 
Appellants sincerely submit that the trial court erred 
in each of the rulings specified under the points herein 
presented and argued. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HANSON, KESLER & HANSON, 
EDWARD G. LINSLEY, and 
I..~EON.A.RD W. ELTON, 
Attorneys for Appellants. 
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